Cursor: agent traces held the credentials that reached its marketplace
Cursor traces its October marketplace compromise to a shared data bucket where stored coding agent traces still held live credentials.
· Cursor · Research by Cursor Team
Cursor says an access key it issued to Fireworks AI let an attacker read stored coding agent traces that still contained unredacted credentials, and that those credentials opened the SaaS tools used to tamper with its marketplace.
01What happened
Cursor published the root cause of its October 2026 marketplace incident on November 13, 2026, after about two weeks of investigation. The Cursor Team says an attacker obtained an access key that Cursor had issued to Fireworks AI, and that Fireworks exposed that key. Cursor says the last attacker activity it saw was on November 1 and was blocked.
02How it works
The key gave read access to a storage bucket Cursor used to share data with Fireworks. That bucket held coding agent traces from sessions outside Privacy Mode, mostly from 2025, and some of those traces still carried unredacted credentials. The attacker used the credentials to reach SaaS tools that Cursor uses, then used a stolen credential to place tampered Claude Code extension builds in the cache serving Cursor's marketplace.
03Who is affected
Cursor puts API credential exposure at under 0.01% of customers, and trace exposure at under 0.05% of users who were not in Privacy Mode. Archived non-production source repositories, limited support records and email, product usage metrics, contact details, conversation summaries and credentials users had sent to support were also reachable. Cursor states that Privacy Mode prompts and code, production systems, customer code repositories and its signed app updates were not affected.
04What to do
Rotate every credential named in Cursor's notification, which Cursor says it sent to affected admins as lists of specific keys, and rotate anything ever sent to Cursor support. Machines that installed Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor marketplace still need the steps in the October 29 notice, which Cursor warns uninstalling alone may not replace.
Questions people ask
- Was my Cursor data in the exposed coding agent traces?
- Cursor says it contacted affected customers directly, and that anyone who received no notification was not in the exposed traces. Exposure was limited to sessions outside Privacy Mode, which Cursor puts at under 0.05% of those users, with API credentials exposed for under 0.01% of customers. Cursor directs questions to security@cursor.com.
- Which credentials should I rotate after the Cursor incident?
- Rotate the specific keys listed in the notification Cursor sent to affected admins, and rotate any credential ever sent to Cursor support, because support records and email were reachable. Credentials that appeared inside coding agent sessions outside Privacy Mode also count, since Cursor says some stored traces kept them unredacted.
- Did the Cursor incident come from a flaw in Anthropic's Claude Code?
- No. Cursor states the incident was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product, and that the attacker published the tampered builds using a stolen Cursor credential. Cursor adds that Open VSX never contained the malware, and that its own app and official updates were not signed with exposed keys. The affected builds were Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313.
- What does Cursor's November 13 update add to its October 29 notice?
- Cursor's October 29 notice covered the tampered Claude Code builds, indicators and remediation. The November 13 update names the entry point, a shared Fireworks bucket of stored agent traces rather than Cursor's production systems, and widens the known data exposure to archived non-production repositories, support records, usage metrics and conversation summaries.
Sources 3 links, all fetched
- 1cursor.comCursor Incident Update
- 2cursor.comCursor Security Notice
- 3fireworks.aiFireworks Bulletin