# Flowise: a public chatflow hands out the MCP server's bearer token

> An unauthenticated request for a public Flowise chatflow returns the MCP bearer token that protects the flow's execution endpoint.

- **Severity:** High: A working attack on a widely used AI product or ecosystem. A fix may exist. Patch or mitigate this week.
- **Category:** Vulnerability
- **Published by:** VulnCheck
- **Disclosed:** 2026-11-17
- **CVE:** CVE-2026-130796
- **CVSS:** 8.8
- **Affects:** Flowise
- **Research by:** [George Chen](https://github.com/geo-chen)
- **Primary source:** https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-3.1.3-through-3.1.4-mcp-server-token-disclosure-via-public-chatflow-endpoint
- **Page:** https://theinjection.dev/items/vulncheck-flowise-mcp-token-public-chatflow/

Flowise 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 return the MCP server's bearer token to anyone who reads a public chatflow, and that token is the only credential guarding the endpoint that runs the flow. The project was archived in August, so no fix is coming.

## What happened

VulnCheck published CVE-2026-130796 on 17 November 2026 and credits George Chen, who posted his own write-up the same day. Chen's timeline says he reported the flaw privately to Flowise on 9 June 2026 and that the maintainer confirmed it as valid. VulnCheck rates the flaw 8.8 and lists no fixed version.

## How it works

The GET /api/v1/public-chatflows/:id handler returns the whole chatflow database row and sanitizes only the flowData field. The mcpServerConfig field passes through untouched, and it holds the chatflow's MCP bearer token in plain text. That token is the only credential protecting POST /api/v1/mcp/:chatflowId, which is also reachable without authentication, so whoever reads the public endpoint can call the flow as an MCP tool with their own input. Chen notes that Flowise's separate chatbot-config endpoint returns a whitelisted projection that leaves the field out.

## Who is affected

VulnCheck lists Flowise 3.1.3 through 3.1.4 as affected. Two settings must both be on: the chatflow marked public, and its MCP server enabled, which Chen says are common and set independently. Flowise's sunset notice moved the repository to public archive on 10 August 2026 and ended core team support on 31 August 2026, so internet-exposed self-hosted instances stay exposed.

## What to do

Turn off the public flag on any chatflow whose MCP server is enabled, or disable the MCP server, then rotate the bearer tokens that were reachable. Teams staying on Flowise have to patch a fork: Chen suggests returning a whitelisted projection from the public chatflow endpoint, or marking mcpServerConfig as not selectable.

## Quick facts

- **Affected:** Flowise 3.1.3 through 3.1.4
- **Fixed in:** No fixed version listed; project archived
- **CVE:** CVE-2026-130796
- **CVSS:** 8.8 high, CVSS v4.0, from VulnCheck
- **Preconditions:** Chatflow marked public and MCP server enabled
- **Found by:** George Chen
- **Disclosed:** Reported 9 June 2026, published 17 November 2026

## Questions

### Is there a patch for CVE-2026-130796 in Flowise?

No patch exists. VulnCheck lists no fixed version for CVE-2026-130796, and the Flowise team moved the repository to public archive on 10 August 2026 and ended support on 31 August 2026 under its sunset plan. Operators who need to keep running Flowise have to apply a fix in a fork, because the core team no longer reviews pull requests.

### How do I check whether my Flowise instance is exposed?

Exposure needs two settings at once: a chatflow marked public, and an MCP server enabled on that same chatflow. Request the public chatflow endpoint with a chatflow id and no credentials, then look for an mcpServerConfig field in the response. A bearer token in that field means an anonymous caller can reach the flow's MCP execution endpoint.

### What can an attacker do with a leaked Flowise MCP token?

Chen's write-up says the token lets an anonymous caller invoke the chatflow as an MCP tool with arbitrary input through the MCP execution route. Calls consume the owner's model credits and reach whatever tools and data the flow connects to. VulnCheck adds that the leak bypasses the API key protection meant to gate that endpoint.

### Why is a flaw reported in June 2026 only public now?

George Chen reported the flaw to Flowise on 9 June 2026 through a private GitHub security advisory, and his timeline shows the maintainer confirmed it, then archived the report on 13 August 2026, with a follow-up on 4 September 2026. Flowise reached end of life on 31 August 2026. VulnCheck published the CVE on 17 November 2026.

## Sources

1. [VulnCheck Advisory](https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-3.1.3-through-3.1.4-mcp-server-token-disclosure-via-public-chatflow-endpoint)
2. [Researcher Write-Up](https://github.com/geo-chen/oss/blob/main/Flowise.md)
3. [GitHub Advisory](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g34g-582q-rw8g)
4. [Flowise Sunset Notice](https://flowiseai.com/sunset)
